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Abstract
Using decentralized reputation systems is a promising
approach to ensuring cooperation and fairness in Mobile
Ad-Hoc Networks. However, they are vulnerable to liars
and robustness has not been analyzed in detail. With our
work, we provide a first step to the analysis of a reputation
system based on a deviation test. Nodes accept second hand
information only if this does not differ too much from their
reputation values. Whereas our earlier paper [13] dealt
with a simplified one-dimensional model, we now consider
the original two-dimensional system. We show that the sys-
tem exhibits a phase transition: In the subcritical regime, it
is robust and lying has no effect. In the supercritical regime,
lying does have an impact. We compute the critical values
via a mean-field approach and use simulations to verify our
results. Thus, we obtain conditions for the deviation test to
make the reputation system robust and provide guidelines
for a good choice of parameters.
1. Introduction
Performance of Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks is well-known
to suffer from free-riding as there is a natural incentive for
nodes to only consume, but not contribute to the services of
the system. We would also like to protect the network from
malicious attacks. One of the ideas that have been consid-
ered to this end is that of a reputation system. Nodes keep
track of their peers’ behaviour and exchange this informa-
tion with others in order to compute a reputation value about
each peer. Nodes with a good reputation are then favoured.
By using second hand information, an accurate estimate
of some subject’s behaviour can be obtained faster. More-
over, a node can have a reputation value about a subject
without ever having interacted with it himself. However, an
inherent problem with any such mechanism is the vulnera-
bility to liars.
A simple idea to protect the system from liars was sug-
gested by Buchegger and Le Boudec [3], [5]. A node be-
lieves second hand information only if it does not differ too
much from the node’s reputation value. This is called the
deviation test. In fact, the system considered in [3], [5] is
more complex. It also allows for using second hand infor-
mation from trusted peers. Therefore each node maintains
both a reputation and a trust value about each of his peers.
The system appears to work well. Performance has only
been evaluated through simulations of a network with a par-
ticular set of assumptions, though (e.g. on the routing pro-
tocol). Further simulations suggested that the deviation test
on its own without the trust component performs nearly as
well [4]. It seems surprising that such a simple idea works
so well and we consider it worth analyzing in more detail
and in a more general context. This is the aim of our re-
search. In our earlier paper [13] we dealt with a simplified
one-dimensional model. We now consider the original two-
dimensional system.
In this paper, we analyze the case of 2 nodes, one honest
and the other a liar. The precise modeling assumptions are
listed in Section 2 and the model is formulated in Section 3.
We provide mean-field results in Section 4 and verify them
by means of simulation in Section 5. We thus show that the
system exhibits a phase transition. That is, there is a thresh-
old proportion of lying below which the reputation value of
the honest node remains unaffected. Above it, the lying will
have an impact and corrupt the reputation system. Thus, we
provide guidelines for a good choice of parameters.
A number of reputation mechanisms have been sug-
gested and studied. Michiardi and Molva propose the col-
laborative reputation mechanism CORE [11]. The CON-
FIDANT Protocol was introduced by Buchegger and Le
Boudec [2]. Aberer and Despotovic [1] suggest a mecha-
nism for P-Grid, a Peer-To-Peer system, that spreads neg-
ative information only. Collaboration enforcement in Peer-
To-Peer systems has also been considered by Moreton and
Twigg [12]. Carbone et al. [6] introduce a formal model
for trust in dynamic networks. Jurca and Faltings [8] and
Fernandes et al. [7] consider incentives for truthful report-
ing itself. The reader is referred to [9] for the EigenTrust
algorithm, a method to compute global trust values in the
presence of pre-trusted peers. However, to the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first analytical approach to eval-
uate a reputation system.
2. Assumptions
2.1. Subject behaviour
We consider the case when there is a single subject
whose reputation is considered. This subject might be one
of the N nodes themselves, but it might also be the provider
of some external service such as Internet access. At each
observation, its actual behaviour is assumed to be either
positive or negative with probabilities θ and 1 − θ respec-
tively, independently of all other observations. The more
practical case when there are M subjects of interest can be
decomposed into M instances of our model, as the M dif-
ferent sets of reputation values do not interfere with each
other.
2.2. Reputation
Each node i maintains a reputation value Ri = Rin about
the subject that reflects its belief about θ at time n. This
opinion might change with new observations, arising either
from interactions with the subject itself or with a peer.
A direct (first hand) observation is an observation of
the subject’s behaviour. Direct observations are always ac-
cepted and the reputation values updated accordingly. An
indirect (second hand) observation arises from interactions
with peers who report about their own direct observations.
Indirect observations are only accepted if the reported ob-
servation does not deviate too far from the current reputa-
tion Rin. This deviation test is controlled by the parameter
d. Moreover, if accepted, the impact of an indirect observa-
tion is scaled by a weighting parameter ω.
We shall restrict attention to the case of 2 nodes, one hon-
est with reputation value Rn about the subject and the other
a liar. This is closely related to the general case, because
several liars can be thought of as a single liar by aggregat-
ing their influence and we can focus on one out of the hon-
est nodes by symmetry. Moreover, it looks like ignoring the
other honest ones could be accounted for by increasing the
proportion of (necessarily truthful) direct interactions, but
this will have to be investigated in more detail (cf. Section
6).
2.3. Interaction model
We shall assume that each node i makes observations at
certain points in time, giving rise to the discrete-time in-
dices n = 1, 2, . . .. With fixed probabilities these are either
direct observations or indirect ones. For the two node case,
an observation by the honest node is assumed direct with
probability p and indirect (i.e. from the liar) with probabil-
ity p¯ = 1 − p. All these events are assumed to be indepen-
dent.
2.4. Adversary model
One needs to make precise assumptions on the adver-
saries’ abilities in order to give performance guarantees. We
shall assume that liars follow the plain strategy to always
lie maximally, i.e. they will always report either extremely
negative or extremely positive behaviour about the subject
when interacting with their peers in an attempt to achieve
maximal impact. It suffices to focus on the extremely nega-
tive part, as the other one is similar by symmetry.
2.5. Performance
A reputation system works well if good nodes in the net-
work benefit from it and bad nodes do not, or at least not as
much. We claim that this can be achieved by suitable reac-
tion mechanisms based on the reputation values, provided
that these values are accurate. Notice that liars can easily
change their own reputation values to anything they want.
So the question is whether they can influence the reputa-
tion values of the honest nodes. The faster the nodes can
obtain accurate estimates, the better the system will work,
but there is a fundamental trade-off between robustness and
speed. We shall assess robustness in detail. It will then
be possible to choose parameters such that the system will
be as fast as possible subject to satisfying a given accuracy
condition.
3. Model
A natural scheme, suggested by the reputation system
in [5] and other proposals, is to keep a history of previ-
ous events. Two counters, αn and βn, are updated when-
ever there is a new observation, either direct or indirect. αn
keeps track of positive observations, βn keeps track of nega-
tive observations. Thus we are led to consider the following
two-dimensional process (αn, βn) for n ≥ 0.
(αn+1, βn+1) = u(αn, βn) +


(1, 0)
(0, 1)
(0, ω)1{ αnαn+βn≤d}
(1)
with probabilities pθ, p(1−θ) and p¯ respectively. The three
possibilities correspond to a positive direct observation, a
negative direct observation and an indirect observation re-
spectively (cf. Sections 2.1 and 2.3).
Direct observations are always accepted and counted
with 1. Indirect observations have to pass the deviation test
with parameter 0 < d < 1, modeled by the indicator func-
tion, and are weighted by ω > 0 as described in Section
2.2. Indirect observations are negative, because they are
obtained from the liar who is assumed to report extremely
negative behaviour (cf. Section 2.4).
Moreover, we discount both components individually
with a discount factor 0 < u < 1, typically very close to
1. This allows the system to gradually forget about old ob-
servations. We want discounting in the model to be able to
track changing behaviour.
The initial conditions are (α0, β0). Note that if ω = 1
then starting with α0 + β0 = 1/(1− u) will leave αn + βn
unchanged, starting elsewhere the sum will converge to
1/(1 − u). Starting with such a converged value is in
fact reasonable, because we would like to allow for track-
ing changing behaviour. However, there can be no a priori
knowledge of a change, so we cannot simply reset the sys-
tem to an arbitrary starting value.
The quantity we are interested in is Rn = αn/(αn+βn).
We examine how well this compares to the true value of θ.
By the initial state R0 we shall mean 11−u (R0, 1 − R0).
Notation is summarized in Table 1.
Note that, although we have defined the process in order
to estimate θ, it does not converge to a constant (in probabil-
ity). For all n, there is positive probability of the next state
taking either one of two values which differ by a constant.
This is due to the discounting. So, we assess convergence
(in distribution) to some limiting distribution from which
we infer θ.
symbol meaning
θ prob. of positive subject behaviour (cf. 2.1)
p prob. of an obs. being direct (cf. 2.3)
p¯ prob. of an obs. being indirect (cf. 2.3)
αn positive reputation component (cf. 3)
βn negative reputation component (cf. 3)
Rn inferred reputation value (cf. 3)
d deviation test parameter (cf. 2.2)
ω weighting factor for indirect obs. (cf. 2.2)
u discount factor (cf. 3)
Table 1. Notation
4. Mean-field approach
In this section we will derive and solve the ‘mean’ or-
dinary differential equation (ODE) associated with our pro-
cess. This is a standard approach in stochastic approxima-
tion theory. For a comprehensive reference see Kushner and
Yin [10]. Usually, one would then show that noise effects
average out asymptotically so that the actual behaviour of
the process is determined by that of the mean ODE. Instead,
in the next section, we will use simulations to verify the
mean-field predictions from our ODE approach directly.
From (1), averaging the dynamics, we obtain the mean
ODE as
α˙(t) = (u− 1)α(t) + pθ
β˙(t) = (u− 1)β(t) + p(1− θ) + ωp¯1{ αα+β≤d}
(2)
This system is discontinuous, but linear above and below
the line of discontinuity α/(α + β) = d. Solving (2), we
find that the system has either one or two solutions, depend-
ing on the parameters of the model.
(α, β) =
p
1− u (θ, 1− θ) (3)
is a solution on α/(α + β) > d and
(α, β) =
(
pθ
1− u,
p(1− θ)
1− u +
ωp¯
1− u
)
(4)
on α/(α + β) ≤ d. (3) is a solution if θ > d and (4) is
a solution if θ ≤ d or p¯ ≥ (θ − d)/(θ − d + ωd). Both
solutions are globally asymptotically stable on their respec-
tive region. Moreover, if only one exists, trajectories in the
other region converge to it also. In this sense it is globally
asymptotically stable for the whole system. Otherwise, both
are stable on their respective region only and, in this sense,
both are locally stable overall.
Theorem 1 If θ > d, p1−u (θ, 1 − θ) is a solution of the
mean ODE (2). For p¯ < p¯c = (θ − d)/(θ − d + ωd) it
is globally asymptotically stable. Otherwise, there exists a
second, false solution 11−u (pθ, p(1− θ)+ωp¯) and both are
locally stable. If θ ≤ d then the latter, false one is globally
asymptotically stable.
Thus, the reputation system exhibits a phase transition
behaviour. Assuming θ > d, we find a bifurcation in terms
of the parameter p¯. In the subcritical regime, that is, for
p¯ < p¯c, the solution corresponding to the true θ is unique.
In the supercritical regime where p¯ ≥ p¯c there is a second,
false solution.
Alternatively, this can be phrased in terms of the system
parameter d. For small d there is only one solution, the true
θθ
π
π 1
Figure 1. Bifurcation plot in terms of d: As d
increases from 0 to 1 the number of solutions
changes from 1 (the true one) to 2 and back
to 1 (the false one). Here, π is short hand for
(pθ)/(p + ωp¯).
one. For intermediate d there are two and for large d there
is only the false solution. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
In practical terms, this suggests that the reputation sys-
tem works and that the liar cannot achieve anything if θ > d
and p¯ < p¯c. However, the liar does have an impact other-
wise. As for the latter condition, it is intuitively clear that
the deviation test can filter out extreme lies only if they do
not occur too often. As for the first condition, it is clear that
if the true θ is too close to the extreme 0 behaviour, the de-
viation test will not filter the lies and the liar will have an
impact. The deviation test cannot protect a ‘very bad’ sub-
ject behaviour to be pushed by the liar to an ‘extremely bad’
perception by the honest node. However, there is a range of
parameters for which it does protect the reputation system.
As mentioned in Section 2, we can repeat the analy-
sis to show that the reputation system similarly protects
against extremely positive reports. Combining the two,
we obtain the following necessary and sufficient conditions
for the true solution to be unique when both, positive and
negative lying are permitted: min{θ, 1 − θ} > d and
p¯ < (min{θ, 1− θ} − d)/(min{θ, 1− θ} − d + ωd).
5. Simulations
In this section we report our simulation results. We used
formulation (1) to compute 105 steps and then plot Rn =
αn/(αn+βn) against n. 100 independent runs were carried
out for each parameter set.
In Figure 2 we show a typical sample path for θ = 0.8
with d = 0.4, u = 0.99, ω = 1 and R0 = 0 when p¯ = 0.2,
i.e. p = 0.8. The lower and upper boundaries in the plot
correspond to Rn = 0 and 1 respectively. The lower and
upper intermediate lines correspond to (pθ)/(p + ωp¯) and
θ respectively. We note that Rn approaches θ and then re-
mains within its neighbourhood until the end of the simula-
tion. All 100 independent runs showed the same qualitative
behaviour.
Note that for the parameter set above the predicted criti-
cal value is p¯c = 0.5 and the subcritical behaviour is as ex-
pected. We obtained the same qualitative behaviour when
p¯ = 0.2 is replaced by p¯ = 0.4 and p¯ = 0.45 < p¯c.
Here, starting with R0 = 0 can be viewed as a worst case.
For other starting values, too, including the other extreme
R0 = 1, we obtained the same qualitative behaviour.
In Figure 3 we illustrate the effect of the discount pa-
rameter u. A typical sample path is shown for the same
parameters as in Figure 3 except u = 0.999. The variabil-
ity around θ is smaller and it takes longer for the process to
approach θ.
In Figure 4 we consider the supercritical case with now
p¯ = 0.8. Also, as opposed to the earlier parameter set
(Figure 2) we take u = 0.95 for clearer illustration. As
a side effect, variability is increased. We note that the pro-
cess settles down for some time in the neighbourhoods of
(pθ)/(p + ωp¯) = pθ = 0.16 and θ = 0.8 in an alternating
fashion. This is in agreement with the mean-field prediction
that both (pθ)/(p+ ωp¯) and θ are solutions. It is due to the
discounting that we do not have convergence to a constant,
but there is always positive probability of moving from one
solution to the other. This can be viewed as another advan-
tage of discounting, because the process cannot get stuck at
the false solution forever.
The same qualitative behaviour is observed in all 100 in-
dependent runs and also for p¯ = 0.6 and p¯ = 0.55 > p¯c,
only the proportion of time spent near θ is higher. Note also
that the second solution depends on p¯ and ω: it is at 0.32
and 0.36 respectively. In Figure 5 we demonstrate that the
long-term behaviour does not depend on the starting value
R0. Whereas in the mean-field approach each (locally sta-
ble) solution has a basin of attraction, we know that there
is always positive probability for the process to move from
one to the other, so the independence of the starting value is
as expected.
With a different choice of parameters the prediction of
only one solution at (pθ)/(p + ωp¯) for the case θ ≤ d can
also be verified. Finally, we carried out simulations with the
same parameters as in Figure 2 except ω = 2 to verify, in
particular, the critical value p¯c = 1/3.
Thus, we have verified the results of the mean-field ap-
proach. In addition, Figures 2 – 5 give us an idea of the
proportion of time near the false (pθ)/(p + ωp¯). This time
increases with p¯.
Figure 2. Typical sample path for θ = 0.8 with d = 0.4, u = 0.99, ω = 1 and R0 = 0 when p¯ = 0.2. We plot
Rn against n, the upper line corresponding to θ and the lower line to (pθ)/(p + ωp¯). Rn approaches
and then remains close to θ.
Figure 3. Typical sample path for the same parameters as in Figure 2 except u = 0.999. The variability
is smaller and it takes longer for the process to approach θ.
Figure 4. Typical sample path for the same parameters as in Figure 2 except p¯ = 0.8 and also u = 0.95.
The process settles down for some time in a neighbourhood of (pθ)/(p + ωp¯) and θ in an alternating
fashion.
Figure 5. Typical sample path for the same parameters as in Figure 4 except R0 = 1. Qualitatively,
the long-term behaviour remains the same.
6. Conclusions and further work
The reputation system will be most robust against lying
if d is chosen small. We have quantified the effect on the
robustness due to a change in d. This is important for the
fundamental trade-off, because smaller d means less use of
second hand information. For a system that is as fast a pos-
sible subject to being accurate on a given range we would
choose the largest d that still satisfies the required accuracy.
In practical terms, we have seen that there is a reasonable
range of parameters for which the deviation test will protect
the reputation systems from liars. Given any cost function
with arbitrary weights on accuracy and speed, we can com-
pute the optimal choice of the system parameter d. One
might also want to think about individually controlled di
based on the nodes’ current information.
The scenario of two peers that we have considered thus
far can also be viewed as an extreme case. Even if all other
nodes are malicious so that all second hand information is
manipulated, the reputation system protects against the ly-
ing if the aggregate proportion of lying is below a threshold.
In a real-world scenario one would typically be able to as-
sume that at least some if not most nodes are honest. To
examine this in more detail, the next step is to consider the
case of three peers: one honest node making direct observa-
tions with probability p, indirect ones originating from the
liar with probability q and indirect ones originating from the
other honest peer with probability 1− p− q.
The next extension is then to consider strategic lying,
that is adversaries attempting something more subtle than
simply lie maximally. For example, they could lie in some
proportion of reports only or they could always report in-
termediate behaviour in an attempt to conceal their lies. It
would also be interesting to consider random noise instead
of fake reports.
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